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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:44 pm
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Results for rule of law
25 results foundAuthor: International Crisis Group Title: Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity Summary: In recent years, Guatemala has been crippled by soaring levels of violent crime and impunity, which threaten the security of population and seriously undermine the country's institutions and state authority. While an outright return of civil war is not expected, the government of President Alvaro Colom has been unable to reduce violent crime. The widespread perception of a lack of government capacity to stem the violence has caused some communities to turn to brutal and extra-institutional vigilantism. This report is the first in a new series that will examine different aspects of the effort to recover the rule of law in Guatemala. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 27p. Source: Internet Resource; Latin America Report No. 33 - 22 June 2010 Year: 2010 Country: Guatemala URL: Shelf Number: 119138 Keywords: Rule of LawVigilantismViolence (Guatemala)Violent Crime |
Author: Cruz, Jose Miguel Title: Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? Summary: Ths study examines public support for the authorities’ respect for the law when fighting criminal violence. Using the 2008 round of the Americas-Barometer, 36,021 respondents from twenty-two countries in the Americas were asked whether authorities should always obey the law or, instead, if they can disregard the law in order to catch criminals. Details: Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2009. 8p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 14, 2010 at: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/kroGfC/I0819%20Should%20Authorities%20Respect%20the%20Law%20When%20Fighting%20Crime%20English.pdf; AmericasBarometer Insights: 2009 (No. 19) Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/kroGfC/I0819%20Should%20Authorities%20Respect%20the%20Law%20When%20Fighting%20Crime%20English.pdf; AmericasBarometer Insights: 2009 (No. 19) Shelf Number: 119605 Keywords: Crime PoliciesPublic Opinion (Latin America)Rule of LawViolent Crime |
Author: Wyler, Liana Sun Title: Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance Summary: Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress. Major programs include the following: • State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections System Support Program (CSSP); • U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) formal and informal ROL stabilization programs (RLS); • Justice Department’s (DOJ’s) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and • Defense Department’s (DOD’s) operational support through Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435). It is difficult to identify all the programs, activities, and actors involved in ROL in Afghanistan, in part because of the continued evolution of U.S. strategy and interagency coordination for supporting the Afghan justice sector. Among the most recent shifts in strategy, U.S. efforts are increasingly resourced by a surge in civilian personnel at the provincial and district levels. To align with counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives, the U.S. government is emphasizing not only ministerial-level institution-building, but also projects to improve local-level access to justice, including projects to support informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Policy coordination among U.S. civilian and military entities involved in ROL efforts in Afghanistan also continues to change—including, most recently, the establishment of an Ambassador-led Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE) directorate at the U.S. Embassy, a Generalled Rule of Law Field Force (ROLFF) under the CJIATF-435, as well as an Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (IPIT) to coordinate all civilian and military ROL activities in Afghanistan. Future shifts in policy approaches may also occur as policymakers seek to address growing concerns regarding Afghan corruption. Observers debate whether or to what extent the increased U.S. commitment to and resources for ROL efforts in Afghanistan will help the U.S. government reach its ultimate goal of developing a stable, capable, and legitimate Afghan government. Many would argue that the challenges in Afghanistan to ROL development and justice sector reform remain substantial and many factors undermine prospects for success. Chief among these are ongoing allegations of severe corruption at all levels of the Afghan government, lack of overall security and stability, limited Afghan government capacity, the existence of competing justice mechanisms, and the persistence of traditional attitudes that perpetuate the perception that well-connected Afghans can avoid facing prosecution and conviction. These debates will likely continue in the 112th Congress, as Members remain concerned with all aspects of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, including authorizing and appropriating ROL-related programs and assistance, as well as conducting oversight on policy implementation and effectiveness. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress R41484: Accessed December 3, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf Shelf Number: 120367 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal Justice Systems (Afghanistan)Rule of Law |
Author: Bayer, Michael D. Title: The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence Summary: A fundamental doctrine of the United States is the system of checks and balances, a system wherein political power is dispersed among various governmental elements so that no particular interests or segments can dominate the government — or the people. One of the most strident criticisms of the former Bush-Cheney administration has been that in the time of crisis and immediately after, and in the years following the 9/11 terror attacks, executive (presidential) authority had been greatly expanded during the strategic response to those attacks and was, according to some, abused — thereby skewing our revered system of checks and balances. Certain segments of governments are acknowledged to be tools of political power — particularly subject to political influences. In the United States the military is exceptionally susceptible to the political designs of the President and the administration because he is their direct-line Commander in Chief. It is also widely acknowledged that intelligence services are part of the political epicenter of governments, because they too are a vitally important direct-line tool of national leadership. As it happened, these are the two segments of our government that benefited most, in terms of power, mission, and funding, from the prosecution of the United States’ Global War on Terrorism. In fact, it had been asserted by former Vice President Cheney on U.S. national television (FOX) that the war on terrorism was an effort to be waged by the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence services and not law enforcement. This book maps out how bureaucratic maneuvering in the aftermath of 9/11 led to the U.S. military/intelligence apparatus assuming primacy and garnering near exclusivity in the international aspect of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This ultimately resulted in the fundamental exclusion of some of the most powerful components of the vast international resources at the fingertips of U.S. law enforcement. The book argues that allowing this to happen was a big mistake — and an unnecessary one at that. The existing networks of international law enforcement are powerful in their own right, but globalization and concomitant worldwide reconfiguration of national sovereignty have greatly empowered inter-governmental networks (such as those of international law enforcement). This book asserts that law enforcement is especially conducive to the advantages aff orded to international networks because the “culture of the badge” provides an immediate basis of trust and commonality to build upon — a commonality that can transcend borders, politics, religion, ethnicity, and other categories of segregation. Furthermore, some international policing scholarship asserts that law enforcement entities seek their own autonomy away from centers of political power by striving to find better, more effi cient ways to serve the state and the public (corruption influences notwithstanding) and in so doing are given the leeway to do so. One way they do this is by engaging in informal means of doing business — seeking one-on-one interaction with foreign counterparts rather than going through multiple layers of bureaucracy and government. Those who work in international law enforcement understand implicitly and explicitly that using informal networks is how most international police business is accomplished — especially in this day and age of e-mail and cell phones. But it is not the power of the network alone that brings value added to transnational policing. It is the sheer volume of numbers of police that are dispersed throughout nearly every nation in the world — and who live and work at all levels of societies, from the back alleys and villages from where terrorism breeds to the wealthiest levels, from where political/religious terrorism is financed. It is the numbers of police combined with their mandates to gather and acquire information — whether for investigative or public security purposes. Police have always had a vested interest in gathering and tracking information about local troublemakers and criminal activity in order to maintain public order and, as such, are a natural resource of acquiring terrorism information — particularly in regard to cells which might be financing or otherwise supporting operations through criminal activity. It is the ability to conduct their business among multiple levels of societies and within populations at large which makes international law enforcement very likely the largest and most potent counterterrorism network on the face of the earth. Hence, the title of this work — The Blue Planet. The worldwide network of police is a formidable asset — made even more formidable by the investigative and arrest authorities bestowed upon U.S. law enforcement and its foreign counterparts. This book will demonstrate that the willful disregard of such a spectacularly valuable asset was not only foolhardy, but also served to deny the American public the measure of national security they would have been entitled had the process been honestly brokered and strategically considered. Instead, in spite of the best of intentions, the parochial interests of the most powerful agencies prevailed at the expense of our own citizens. Police can and do cooperate with one another internationally to combat transnational crime. Organizations such as Interpol and Europol exist for this purpose — but those organizations, while valuable, bring with them the burdens and inefficiencies of their own diplomatic formalities, rules, regulations, and procedures along with the accompanying bureaucracies of participating member governments. Informal policing has been around for even longer than formal arrangements, and evolved as an efficient means to deal with the internationalization of crime. Transnational terrorism is an extreme form of international crime, but it is very often supported by other types of organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking, weapons trading, and document fraud. One of the main objections from abroad of the U.S.’s conduct of the war on terrorism has been the perceived disregard for the “rule of law,” particularly among our European allies. While some critics might find the worldwide unification of law enforcement cause for concern, this work will argue that the potential for human rights abuses are far more likely under war conditions and intelligence operations than by globally enabled police. While the potential for human rights abuses certainly exists, national law enforcement elements respecting their own “rule of law” and the laws of counterpart nations will find the means to cooperate within existing legal frameworks. Th is work will also argue that international police cooperation is one way that weak nations can serve to build their own governmental infrastructures and contribute in a positive way to international relations. There will be those who will assert that the current manner in which the United States deals with gathering terrorism information from our present intelligence posture provides adequate worldwide coverage of the problem. But even a cursory analysis of the numbers of sources available to worldwide police networks versus rational estimates of intelligence assets will show those assertions to be implausible. There are also those who might argue that international police interaction is problematic because police are an instrument of force and are endowed with powers that can be abused. This concern is valid in that abuse of police powers can readily impact human rights. The idea of informal international police relationships that are unregulated and therefore lack accountability can seem a slippery slope. However, the trend since 9/11 has been to attempt to integrate law enforcement with functions of intelligence services — as what occurred in the United States with the FBI. This linkage is gaining acceptance and is being implemented throughout Europe but it is implicitly far more slippery. The intelligence service/law enforcement dichotomy is primarily one of legal versus extra-legal constructs. Intelligence services are extra-legal forces unconstrained by legality and matters of sovereignty — and they too can be, and often are, instruments of force. When the two are integrated, the idea of rule of law becomes moot because of the extra-legal prerogatives of intelligence services — “poisoning” the law enforcement function and therefore the rule of law. It is no coincidence that one of the hallmarks of a police state is the convergence of the legal policing and extra-legal intelligence functions. Law enforcement, on the other hand, is legally sanctioned and generally permitted to exercise its authorities for the benefit of the greater good. This work advocates solely for the legal and legitimate exercise of the rule of law through international police cooperation, whether through formal channels or through the much more powerful and effective informal networking. If a nation’s laws forbid informal police cooperation, so be it. But national governments should recognize the positive role that international police cooperation can serve — not the least of which is serving the right of the people (or the people of other nations) not to be exploited, molested, or harmed by external criminal forces. Eight years later we are still experiencing the after-eff ects of the 9/11 attacks. When the consequences can be nuclear, biological, or chemical, especially in these precarious times, can we afford to deny our public the benefits of such a powerful instrument of counterterrorism—the informal networks made available to U.S. law enforcement? Details: Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2010. 205p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2011 at: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Shelf Number: 121720 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringInternational CooperationInternational Law EnforcementInternational PolicingNational SecurityPolicing NetworksRule of LawTerrorism |
Author: United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Title: United Nations Rule of Law Indicators - Implementation Guide and Project Tools Summary: Building and strengthening the “rule of law” in developing nations, particularly countries in transition or emerging from a period of armed conflict, has become a central focus of the work of the United Nations. As a result, there is growing demand throughout the United Nations system to better understand the delivery of justice in conflict and post-conflict situations and the impact of developments in this area. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), in cooperation with other United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes, have developed an instrument to monitor changes in the performance and fundamental characteristics of criminal justice institutions in conflict and post-conflict situations. The instrument consists of a set of indicators, the United Nations Rule of Law Indicators. This Guide describes how to implement this instrument and measure these indicators. The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators and this Guide are part of an emerging body of empirically based approaches to measuring the strengths and effectiveness of law enforcement, judicial and correctional institutions. The instrument, in contrast to some other measurement tools, is designed to highlight apparent successes and shortcomings within institutions and to monitor changes over time within countries. It is not meant to support direct comparisons between countries or rank them. The instrument refers, as it should, to all relevant international human rights and criminal justice norms and standards, but is not designed to assess compliance with such norms and standards. Nor is the instrument a substitute for a detailed assessment of the capacity or performance of criminal justice institutions, including for programmatic purposes. The instrument is to be implemented in collaboration with national Governments and potentially adopted by them as an ongoing monitoring mechanism. Participating countries will find this instrument very useful for monitoring their own progress in developing their criminal justice institutions and strengthening the rule of law. The instrument will also provide and summarize accurate information which the United Nations, donors and development partners will be able to use to plan and monitor the impact of their efforts to build the capacity of criminal justice institutions and, more generally, strengthen the rule of law. Additionally, the process of implementing the indicators will strengthen relationships between the United Nations and participating national Governments, relationships that are crucial to the Organization’s objectives of promoting peace and security in conflict and post-conflict situations and building sustainable criminal justice institutions that provide equal access to justice for all individuals. The Guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to implement the instrument, with United Nations support, in a conflict or post-conflict setting. It is meant for first-time users of the instrument who have a general knowledge of the United Nations system, previous experience working in such situations, a good knowledge of criminal justice institutions and a familiarity with social sciences research methods. Details: New York: United Nations, 2011. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2011 at: http://www.unrol.org/files/United%20Nations%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Indicators%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unrol.org/files/United%20Nations%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Indicators%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 121995 Keywords: Criminal Justice AdministrationCriminal Justice SystemsRule of Law |
Author: von Carlowitz, Leopold Title: Local Ownership in Practice: Justice System Reform in Kosovo and Liberia Summary: Achieving local ownership is crucial for the success of justice reform programmes as part of international rule of law assistance and security sector reform (SSR) activities. This paper examines and compares the UN approaches to and experiences with local ownership in its efforts to reform the justice system in Kosovo and in Liberia. It thereby seeks to foster a better understanding of the concept and its implementation in practice. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2011. 66p. Source: DCAF Occasional Paper No. 23: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2012 at http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35955/527127/file/OP23.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35955/527127/file/OP23.pdf Shelf Number: 123960 Keywords: Criminal Justice Reform (Kosovo) (Liberia)Rule of Law |
Author: Durch, William J. Title: Understanding Impact of Police, Justice and Corrections Components in UN Peace Operations Summary: Over the last decade or so, the UN Security Council gave complex UN peace operations broader mandates in police development, followed by mandates to help restore criminal justice systems and eventually for advisory support to national prison systems. The UN's rule of law community recognizes that an emphasis on quality of people and plans, what the UN calls a "capability-based approach," has to replace a quantity-based approach to meeting the requirements of such mandates. The Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations Program responded to a request from the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in DPKO, coordinating with its Police Division and Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS), to study the effects, or more specifically, the impact that police, justice and corrections components in UN peace operations have on the areas in which they work. The study was set up to search for "minimum essential tasks" - those that 1) always seem needed in comparable ways across missions; and 2) seem to consistently have the desired effects on the host country's approach to police, justice and corrections. It found that while certain tasks may always be needed, their implementation is often dependent on characteristics of a mission's operational environment over which the mission cannot exert direct control. Missions face perhaps irresolvable dilemmas in being asked to deploy quickly into places where politics can prevent the quick actions that peacebuilding precepts dictate, or with resources inadequate to substitute for capacities that government lacks. That is, they often have resources sufficient to offer some security and stability but not sufficient for very much else. The study identifies areas where the imprints left by the police, justice and corrections components of UN missions are larger than those of other players and offers recommendations for those components. Details: Washington, DC: Future of Peace Operations Program, The Stimson Center, 2012. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2012 at: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stimson_Police_Justice_and_Corrections_Impact_Report_FW_small.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stimson_Police_Justice_and_Corrections_Impact_Report_FW_small.pdf Shelf Number: 125536 Keywords: Criminal Justice SystemsPeace OperationsRule of LawUnited Nations |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: •Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Summary: For two centuries, Afghanistan was a buffer zone between contending international powers rather than a nation State. Resistance to the Soviet invasion during the Cold War and the following acute civil conflict have, over the past 30 years, wreaked havoc with vital infrastructure and weakened the precarious social contract between centre and periphery. Afghanistan today produces 93 per cent of the world’s opium and poses enormous challenges to reconstruction and state-building. Among the interrelated challenges are corruption, weak governance and poor security. The following pages report on the results of an in-depth thematic evaluation of the response of UNODC to those challenges over the period from December 2001 to March 2007. This is the first technical assistance evaluation of a country programme conducted by UNODC. The present evaluation examines, in turn, efforts to build the capacity of Afghanistan government agencies via five subprogrammes: alternative livelihoods, rule of law, law enforcement, drug demand reduction and illicit crop monitoring. The reports include the following: Volume 1: Consolidated Evaluation Report on the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Volume 2: Alternative Livelihoods Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 3: Law Enforcement Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 4: Rule of Law Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 5: Drug Demand Reduction Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 6: Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2008. 6 volumes Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/thematic-evaluation-reports.html Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/thematic-evaluation-reports.html Shelf Number: 115370 Keywords: Drug ControlDrugs and Crime (Afghanistan)OpiumRule of Law |
Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation Summary: This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically. After providing definitions of capacity and capacity building, this brief outlines the five basic principles of the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as they relate to capacity development. The discussion then turns to how criminal justice and rule of law capacity building can contribute to countering terrorism and to mitigating conditions conducive to violent extremism by enhancing the capacity of weak state institutions to deliver equitable security and justice to all. It concludes by offering guidance based on best practices and lessons learned from past and ongoing capacity-building efforts in accordance with key themes presented over the course of the brief. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: www.globalct.org Year: 2012 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128208 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRule of LawTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Coburn, Noah Title: Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan Summary: This report analyzes the array of programs that dealt with the so-called informal justice sector in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2011. It focuses on a series of pilot projects sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace that engaged local Afghan organizations at the district and provincial levels to observe and record how informal justice systems resolve (or fail to resolve) people’s disputes, and how informal and formal justice actors relate to each other in practice. It also examines the expanding role of international actors in local dispute resolution and the impact that such interventions have had on local practices and perceptions of justice. The report finds that the informal justice sector provides a pervasive and effective, if sometimes flawed, venue for the majority of the Afghan population to access justice and argues that the international community should commit more fully to supporting local informal justice mechanisms. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2013 at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW84-Informal%20Justice%20and%20the%20International%20Community%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW84-Informal%20Justice%20and%20the%20International%20Community%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 128424 Keywords: Dispute ResolutionDispute SettlementInformal Justice System (Afghanistan)Rule of Law |
Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Microdynamics of Illegitimacy and Complex Urban Violence in Medellin, Colombia Summary: For most of the past 25 years, Medellin, Colombia, has been an extreme case of complex, urban violence, involving not just drug cartels and state security forces, but also street gangs, urban guerrillas, community militias, paramilitaries, and other nonstate armed actors who have controlled micro-territories in the city's densely populated slums in ever-shifting alliances. Before 2002, Medellin's homicide rate was among the highest in the world, but after the guerrillas and militias were defeated in 2003, a major paramilitary alliance disarmed and a period of peace known as the "Medellin Miracle" began. Policy makers facing complex violence elsewhere were interested in finding out how that had happened so quickly. The research presented here is a case study of violence in Medellin over five periods since 1984 and at two levels of analysis: the city as a whole, and a sector called Caicedo La Sierra. The objectives were to describe and explain the patterns of violence, and determine whether legitimacy played any role, as the literature on social stability suggested it might. Multilevel, multidimensional frameworks for violence and legitimacy were developed to organize data collection and analysis. The study found that most decreases in violence at all levels of analysis were explained by increases in territorial control. Increases in collective (organized) violence resulted from a process of "illegitimation," in which an intolerably unpredictable living environment sparked internal opposition to local rulers and raised the costs of territorial control, increasing their vulnerability to rivals. As this violence weakened social order and the rule of law, interpersonal-communal (unorganized) violence increased. Over time, the "true believers" in armed political and social movements became marginalized or corrupted; most organized violence today is motivated by money. These findings imply that state actors, facing resurgent violence, can keep their tenuous control over the hillside slums (and other "ungoverned" areas) if they can avoid illegitimizing themselves. Their priority, therefore, should be to establish a tolerable, predictable daily living environment for local residents and businesses: other anti-violence programs will fail without strong, permanent, and respectful governance structures. Details: College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2010. 657p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 6, 2013 at: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/10242 Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/10242 Shelf Number: 128671 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMilitiasOrganized CrimeParamilitariesRule of LawUrban AreasViolence (Colombia)Violent Crime |
Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Strengthening the Case: Good Criminal Justice Practices to Counter Terrorism Summary: The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector elaborates guidance on 15 good practices that promote rule of law-based criminal justice responses to terrorism. The GCTF encourages all countries to consider the Rabat Memorandum as a source of guidance and its members and partners have been working both bilateral and multilaterally to promote its implementation national and regional contexts. In support of these efforts, the US Department of State Counterterrorism Bureau commissioned the Global Center to undertake a stocktaking of national efforts to implement rule of law-based criminal justice measures to counter terrorism in selection of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report presents the core findings of the stocktaking project. It highlights trends, challenges, and opportunities for implementing the good practices of the Rabat Memorandum and for leveraging these practices to more effectively counter terrorism while promoting and protecting human rights. As noted in the introduction of the Rabat Memorandum, compliance with international law and human rights standards in national criminal justice responses to terrorism is not isolated to the mere existence of certain legal tools, or to the skills of specialized practitioners alone. Rather, it recognizes that "states should in the first instance have a modern, fair and efficient criminal justice system that forms the basis for a robust criminal justice response to terrorism." While the Global Center's report highlights examples of a wide range of good practices being implemented in national jurisdictions, it also calls attention to diverse legal and institutional, organizational, and operational challenges that seriously undermine rule of law-based criminal justice across all countries examined. As stated in the Rabat Memorandum, criminal justice efforts to counter terrorism "must be built on a functional criminal justice system that is capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the human rights of the accused." The findings suggest that core criminal justice sector development efforts are essential for strengthening national implementation of rule of law based criminal justice practices to counter terrorism. The report concludes with a series of cross-cutting recommendations to support the ongoing efforts of the GCTF's Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf Shelf Number: 136852 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismRule of LawTerrorism |
Author: Marston, Jerome Francis Title: Parallel Power: Challengers to the Democratic Rule of Law in Rio de Janeiro Brazil from 2000 to 2010 Summary: his thesis seeks to explore how drug cartels achieved de facto sovereign control over the favelas of Rio de Janeiro between 2000 and 2010, effectively preventing the Brazilian state from guaranteeing the rule of law uniformly throughout national territory. It also investigates the extent to which Brazilian citizens have suffered human rights abuses as a result. Drawing on both primary and secondary evidence, I argue that drug cartels gained sovereignty over these enclaves as a combined result of state weakness and cartel strength. The Brazilian state forfeited these territories a century ago, because it was infrastructurally weak to such an extent that it was unable to systematically penetrate them in order to monopolize violence, enforce laws, and provide public services. The cartels, in turn, exploited the favelas as ideal locations for the transport, repackaging, and sale of drugs. Benefiting from the profits of illicit activities, the gangs transformed into well-armed, bellicose organizations that maintained authority over the communities by performing state-like duties. In due course, organized crime amassed sufficient control over the favelas to thwart most state encroachments. Examining the exceptions, I found that the limited police encroachments were largely rights abusive - save those made by the Pacifying Police Units. State weakness and cartel strength have disjointed the rule of law and undermined democracy in Brazil. Details: Boston: Boston College, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:101598 Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:101598 Shelf Number: 140372 Keywords: FavelasOrganized CrimeRule of Law |
Author: Solar, Carlos Title: The Governance of Organised Crime in Chile 1990-2014 Summary: The re-democratisation of Chile set an important landmark for the governing of the country's security. Despite the initial effort undertaken by the democratically elected authorities to ensure the rule of law, the passing of time soon exposed the state's limited capacity for confronting the pressing risks that came along with more openness in the country. The perilous evidence of organised crime swarming in the country caught many of the country’s public security actors unaware and thus confused regarding their response. A series of factors undermining an encompassing response to complex criminality were evident. Public security institutions lacked the knowledge, skills, and resources and, what is more, they were highly divorced from one another due to their previous experiences in delivering security within a dictatorship. However, and almost 25 years later, the governance of organised crime had been transformed into a complex engagement of policy dissimilar to that of early re-democratisation. Multiple public institutions, demonstrating a set of highly interconnected relationships, were able to engage in policy networks to put forth a series of security policy plans. This thesis aims to explore the scholarly relevance of such governance evolution by asking the following research question: how can we explain the governing relationships that Chile’s public institutions have put up to confront organised crime since redemocratisation? This research project explains therefore how public security actors have been able to move away from inward and hierarchical patterns of policy action and develop instead horizontal relations that favour an inter-institutional style of policy-making. Through its empirical research, this thesis argues that Chile's state bureaucracies have been able to steer the governance of organised crime; however, not within the realms of a central unified authority, but through a set of self-governing institutions that, since the 1990 return to democracy, have gradually adopted norms, practices, and beliefs. Details: York, UK: University of York, 2016. 298p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/42606048.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Chile URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/42606048.pdf Shelf Number: 147929 Keywords: Criminal NetworksOrganized CrimeRule of Law |
Author: Payan, Tony Title: Security, the Rule of Law, and Energy Reform in Mexico Summary: This paper argues that Mexico must anticipate and resolve potential problems in organized crime, corruption and natural resource allocation priorities in order to successfully implement its energy reforms. This paper is part of a Baker Institute Mexico Center research project examining the rule of law in Mexico and the challenges it poses to implementing the country's energy reform. Details: Baker Institute Mexico Center, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 8, 2016 at: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/6bf37bd2/MEX-pub-RuleofLaw_PC-120116.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/6bf37bd2/MEX-pub-RuleofLaw_PC-120116.pdf Shelf Number: 140350 Keywords: Natural Resources Organized Crime Rule of Law |
Author: Lefas, Melissa Title: Delivering Justice: Views from Supreme Courts on Countering Terrorism Summary: Supreme court justices play an important role in strengthening state capacities to bring terrorists to justice within the framework of human rights and the rule of law. As final arbiters, justices seated at the highest courts of law are the nation’s safeguards of the rule of law and human rights, especially when the executive and legislative branches favor national security over these individual rights. The report synthesizes the discussions held with supreme court justices over the course of an 18-month program in the Euro-Med region (Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa), implemented in partnership with UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and funded by the European Commission. The program aimed to create a sustainable, nonpolitical forum for supreme court-level and senior judicial officials to discuss, among equals, questions of law arising from terrorism-related cases and to share strategies, frameworks, and good practices for handling these cases over the course of five consultations. The final component of the program brought the First Presidents of the Cassation Courts of Lebanon and Tunisia, as well as other supreme court justices, to discuss their views on how the international community should respond to the threat of terrorism in an open briefing before CTED at the UN headquarters, held in March 2016. The report is organized around priority issue areas raised by the justices over the course of the program and includes case studies, best practices, and legal commentary on possible resolutions to the common challenges they face in the adjudication of terrorism cases. It further describes a series of international and regional initiatives to support the judiciary, reflecting on the value of interjudicial exchanges in this domain. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-December-Delivering-Justice.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-December-Delivering-Justice.pdf Shelf Number: 140500 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Rule of LawTerrorism |
Author: McCartan, Brian Title: Ethnic Armed Actors and Justice Provision in Myanmar Summary: As a result of decades of ongoing civil war, large areas of Myanmar remain outside government rule, or are subject to mixed control and governance by the government and an array of ethnic armed actors (EAAs). These included ethnic armed organizations, with ceasefires or in conflict with the state, as well as state-backed ethnic paramilitary organizations, such as the Border Guard Forces and People's Militia Forces. Despite this complexity, order has been created in these areas, in large part through customary justice mechanisms at the community level, and as a result of justice systems administered by EAAs. Though the rule of law and the workings of Myanmar's justice system are receiving increasing attention, the role and structure of EAA justice systems and village justice remain little known and therefore, poorly understood. As such, The Asia Foundation is pleased to present this research on justice provision and ethnic armed actors in Myanmar. Details: Yangon, Myanmar: Asia Foundation, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: POLICY DIALOGUE BRIEF SERIES NO.17: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Policy-Brief_Ethnic-Armed-Actors-and-Justice-Provision-in-Myanmar_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Burma URL: http://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Policy-Brief_Ethnic-Armed-Actors-and-Justice-Provision-in-Myanmar_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 144723 Keywords: Justice Systems Rule of Law |
Author: Selth, Andrew Title: Police Reform in Burma (Myanmar): Aims Obstacles and Outcomes Summary: Despite all the publicity that Burma has received since the inauguration of a hybrid military-civilian parliament in 2011, and the launch of an ambitious reform program by President Thein Sein, there are some important issues which seem to have escaped serious study. It has become clear, for example, that the new government wishes not only to reinvigorate plans to expand and remodel the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), but also to give it a more distinctive civilian style and ethos, and see it take greater responsibility for some key aspects of the country's internal security. Indeed, such steps will be essential if Burma is to strengthen the rule of law and make an orderly transition to a genuine and sustainable democracy. The armed forces (Tatmadaw) will remain responsible for external defence and for counter-insurgency campaigns against armed ethnic groups. However, it seems to be envisaged that, as part of the broad democratisation process, the MPF will assume a greater role in terms of law enforcement and the maintenance of internal order. Already, there are more blue uniforms than green uniforms on the streets protecting VIPs and standing static guard outside diplomatic missions. The police can also be expected to play a larger part in quelling civil unrest, with the army only called upon to provide aid to the 'civil' power during emergencies, as occurred in Arakan (Rakhine) State in 2012 and Meiktila in 2013. To this end, the MPF is being expanded, restructured and modernised. It is already larger and more powerful than it has been since the colonial era, but the goal is a force of over 100,000 men and women, with 34 'combat' battalions. Recruitment and officer corps entry standards have been raised. At the same time, the MPF's doctrine and training programs are being changed to give greater emphasis to 'community-based policing' by unarmed officers working in close cooperation with the civil population. This approach is not completely new to Burma but, if fully and successfully adopted, it will be in stark contrast to the tough paramilitary style of policing that has characterised the force since General Ne Win's 1962 coup. As the Indonesian example has shown, however, such a transition will be neither quick nor easy. Burma's armed forces remain very powerful. There will be some areas, such as intelligence collection and internal security operations, where the interests of the MPF and Tatmadaw will overlap. The respective roles, responsibilities and associated benefits of the two institutions may be sorted out - probably in the Tatmadaw's favour - but there is likely to be friction. Also, there are cultural issues in the police force which will take a long time to resolve. Corruption and the abuse of power, for example, are deeply-rooted problems that will be difficult to eradicate. Until they are, the force's relations with the general population will remain problematical. Should the MPF be able to reinvent itself, however, it has the potential to make a major contribution to Thein Sein's reform program and the development of a more democratic, stable and humane society in Burma. Also, as an important civilian body answerable to the public through an 'elected' government, its behaviour - and treatment by the government - will be important indicators of progress in current attempts to implement the rule of law in Burma and make the security forces more accountable for their actions. Details: Brisbane: Griffith University, Griffith Asia Institute, 2013. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Regional Outlook Paper, No. 44: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/Selth-2013-Police_Reform-red.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Burma URL: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/Selth-2013-Police_Reform-red.pdf Shelf Number: 144725 Keywords: Criminal Justice ReformPolice CorruptionPolice ReformPolicingRule of Law |
Author: White, Stephen Title: Police Primacy Summary: Initially prompted by a query on a discussion forum for the International Network to Promote Rule of Law (INPROL), this research memorandum addresses the topic of police primacy. The original query pointed out that although the concept of police primacy is considered an objective in many police reform processes, there is little research on the term and no common understanding of what it means. Research and interviews conducted as a response to the initial query and in preparation for this paper confirm the assertion that no standard definition of police primacy exists and that the term is used to describe a number of different concepts. These definitions often relate to internal security and public safety arrangements where police have a monopoly on public order and law enforcement. Most commonly, these definitions refer to broad situations where, for example, international actors aim to enable indigenous police to be at the forefront of rule of law and security interventions. Research thus indicates that the term "police primacy" encompasses more than one definition and is dependent on the context in which it is used. On occasions, it means that a prime (or priority) objective of its implementation is the reform of police organization. On other occasions, it is used to propose that policing developments be a central strand of some bigger, universal reform such as peacebuilding and political settlement. On yet other occasions, it may mean that the police will take the lead in operations such as counterterrorism; or it may be used to mean primacy of the law, as, for example, when a society is emerging from a period of military control during which criminal law and policing were relegated to a lower status than they typically enjoy. This ambiguity highlights the relevance and importance of seeking an answer to the question "What is police primacy?" Because it is a phrase commonly used by military commanders, diplomats, security sector reform experts, and others who operate in difficult and dangerous scenarios, this is no mere academic debate. Those who call for police primacy as a solution to major problems, those who plan for it, and those who are responsible for delivering it must understand exactly what the term implies and embraces in a specific context. Those impacted by it and those charged with evaluating it must also commence from a mutually understood starting point. Policing and the relationships between police institutions and civil society are of vital importance to peace and stability around the globe. There are reports of police officers, the most visible representatives of the state for most citizens, being injured or killed in politically motivated attacks from China to Ukraine, Nigeria to Iraq, and Bahrain to Egypt. In Northern Ireland, attempted murders of police continue to blight the peace process. These cases highlight the difficulties faced by those who design, lead, and implement police primacy reforms and strategies in conflict and post-conflict situations. However, as this research memorandum demonstrates, the alternative to police primacy - military-led responses devoid of policing expertise and lacking a central vision of police primacy - often lead to even greater problems in the long term. A key recommendation in this memorandum is to accept the fact that the term "police primacy" has at least two main strands and to move beyond this notion by focusing on what the real goal is in a given situation and how it can best be achieved. The common theme running through all the work in this area is, undoubtedly, police reform. The focus therefore should be on the most effective means to manage and deliver strategic change within police institutions. This research memorandum examines several police interventions and change programs. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that, whenever and wherever police reform is attempted in order to establish police primacy (thereby strengthening the rule of law), certain major challenges and common obstacles are likely to arise. This paper highlights some critical success factors that, if addressed at the outset, may increase the chances of success. A key implication flowing from the notion of police primacy as defined here is that in most, if not all, police reform programs the aim is to elevate the police to a level of proficiency that enables them to take a prime role in delivering public safety and fighting crime and counterterrorism while gaining the trust of all citizens. This in turn implies that the police institutions must be reformed in such a way as to meet international standards in terms of modern, democratic, and professional policing. If strategic change is required, best practices in change management techniques and delivery are needed. This research memorandum highlights what can go wrong in such reforms and offers suggestions about how to avoid some obstacles and to minimize some problems. A sensible starting point is an agreed-on vision of what "good policing" looks like - bearing in mind that in each cultural, social, and political context, various degrees of emphasis may be required. Following this, attention is paid to who and what types of organizations conduct police primacy efforts, after which observations and conclusions are offered about what can go wrong and how to improve the prospects for success. Case studies of police primacy in action are presented to reinforce the key points made in this memorandum. Finally, overall conclusions and recommendations are proposed. Details: s.l.: International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL), 2014. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Memorandum: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://www.inprol.org/publications/13324/police-primacy Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.inprol.org/publications/13324/police-primacy Shelf Number: 148523 Keywords: Police Legitimacy Police Reform Policing Rule of Law |
Author: Global Witness Title: Illegal Logging in the Rio Platano Biosphere: A Farce in Three Acts Summary: Honduras, a country rich in natural resources and cultural diversity, struggles against poverty and environmental degradation: it is the third poorest country in Latin America and the second poorest in Central America. Poverty is much more acute in a rural context, so forested areas largely coincide with the poorest ones. The country is well suited to forestry practices, and 41.5 percent of its territory is currently covered with forests. However, decades of agricultural colonisation and the expansion of cattle ranching have resulted in extensive deforestation and related environmental degradation, most notably the deterioration of water resources and soil erosion. In a country that is prone to hurricanes and flooding, environmental degradation worsens the impact of these natural disasters. Severe governance failure in the Honduran forest sector is threatening the country's largest protected area, the UNESCO-accredited Man and the Biosphere Reserve of Rio Platano (hereafter the Rio Platano Biosphere), and the people living in and around it. Corruption at the highest level and a complete lack of accountability have led to environmental destruction and undermined the rights of local people and their efforts towards sustainable forestry. This report makes the case for greater national and international efforts to strengthen forest governance and the rule of law. It is based on Global Witness' on-the-ground research, interviews with key actors and a review of existing official documents and other sources of information. It aims to: (i) document, expose and analyse this case, (ii) identify lessons that can be learned in Honduras and elsewhere and (iii) present a series of recommendations for the various parties involved, in particular the Institute of Forest Conservation and Development (ICF), which is the new Honduran forest authority created by the Forest Law approved on 13 September 2007. The Rio Platano Biosphere has a long history of illegal logging. This report, however, focuses on one particular case: the legalisation of so-called 'abandoned' timber in 2006-2007, and its links to state mismanagement. It illustrates how illegal logging is often not only tolerated, but also promoted, by the authorities in charge. As this report will describe in more detail: - In his inauguration speech on 27 January 2006, President Zelaya committed to eradicating illegal logging in the country, but just a few months later the Honduran forest authority at the time (AFECOHDEFOR) implemented a policy that achieved the opposite: it approved regulatory procedures to effectively legalise illegally-logged mahogany, and did so contravening the law and without any consultation or independent oversight. The implementation of these resolutions spurred a race to illegally log the Rio Platano Biosphere. - The policy was part of a carefully designed plan to launder illegal timber from the most important protected area in the country. - Two months later, the regulatory procedures were suspended as a result of pressure from civil society and an investigation carried out by the Special Environmental Public Prosecutor (FEMA). However, there remained a strong determination to legalise this timber and a new, more sophisticated plan, was rolled out. This included the establishment of contracts with local cooperatives and the subsequent auction of the timber so that the people who financed the illegal logging were able to buy that same timber, now apparently legal. - As a result, as much as 8,000 cubic metres of mahogany were illegally felled. More than 14.7 million lempiras (approximately USD$780,000) of public funds were indirectly delivered to well-known illegal timber traffickers. - Cooperatives at a local level suffered greatly from this experience. Illegal logging of mahogany decreased the value of their forests and jeopardised the opportunity to develop viable community forestry initiatives. Vested interests manipulated some of these organisations to launder illegal timber and in so doing undermined their credibility. The case presented here had dramatic consequences in the Honduran context. However, it should also be looked at within a broader context. What this report documents will unquestionably resonate in other areas around the world experiencing similar issues. What characterises such cases is the disparity between political rhetoric and the vested interests driving the actions of government institutions. Such poor governance goes unchecked in part due to the lack of a transparent and participatory process in the management of the forest resources. At a time when forests have taken centre stage in climate change negotiations, the need to tackle illegal logging and associated deforestation and degradation is more pressing than ever. Deforestation accounts for around 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and addressing this problem is seen by many as the most cost effective way of reducing these harmful emissions. A post-Kyoto agreement could help to ensure that forests are left standing so that they can be used sustainably by the people living in and around them. Good governance in Honduras and elsewhere is an essential prerequisite for the protection and sustainable use of forests. This, coupled with addressing the drivers of deforestation and empowering forest dependent communities, should be the focus of any forest and climate strategy. Sustainable forest management could play a significant role in supporting the livelihoods of local populations and fighting poverty, while at the same time maintaining the ecological value of forests. Details: Washington, DC: Global Witness, 2009. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2018 at: file:///C:/Users/AuthUser/Downloads/illegal_logging_in_rio_platano_final_en_low_res.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Honduras URL: file:///C:/Users/AuthUser/Downloads/illegal_logging_in_rio_platano_final_en_low_res.pdf Shelf Number: 153347 Keywords: Abandoned TimberCorruptionEnvironmental CrimeForest GovernanceGood GovernanceIllegal LoggingIllegal Timber TraffickersMahogonyRule of lawTimber smugglingTimber theft |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 63 percent since 2016, reaching a new record high. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63 percent increase or 127,000 hectares more compared to the previous year. This level of opium poppy cultivation is a new record high and exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 (224,000 hectares) by 104,000 hectares or 46 percent. Strong increases were observed in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 percent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37%), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116%), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39%). The majority (60%) of cultivation took place in the South of the country. The Western region accounted for 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region for 13% and the Eastern region for 7%. The remaining regions (North-eastern and Central) together accounted for 3%. Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, Farah, Balkh, Nimroz and Badakhshan. Opium poppy cultivation expanded to new regions and intensified where there was cultivation before. In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 13 to 10. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation increased from 21 to 24. Ghazni, Samangan and Nuristan provinces lost their poppy-free status. Ghazni had been poppy-free for more than two decades (since 1995), Samangan and Nuristan for almost 10 years (since 2007). Starting in 2014, the Northern region experienced a rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation. In 2014, a total of 574 hectares was cultivated in three out of seven provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari-Pul); in 2017, only one province remained poppy-free (Bamyan) and some 43,000 hectares were cultivated in the other six provinces. Cultivation in Balkh, which was poppy-free until 2014, expanded from 204 hectares in 2015 to 12,100 hectares in 2017. In Jawzjan, which was poppy-free between 2008 and 2015, cultivation increased from 409 hectares in 2016 to 3,200 hectares in 2017. In Sari-Pul (last time poppy-free in 2013), cultivation expanded from 195 hectares in 2014 to 3,600 hectares in 2017. Opium poppy cultivation intensified in the main opium-poppy cultivating provinces by holding a more significant share of the available agricultural land. In Hilmand, a third of the arable land was dedicated to opium poppy in 2017, whereas only 20% was under cultivation in 2016. Less drastically, but still significant increases in density could be observed in Uruzgan and Nangarhar where a fourth of the arable land was under opium poppy cultivation in 2017 compared to 19% in Uruzgan and 16% in Nangarhar in 2016. Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 395 hectares but remained very low. In 2017, 750 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 14 provinces (355 hectares in 7 provinces in 2016). During the 2017 eradication campaign, six lives were lost and eight persons were injured. In 2016, eight lives were lost and seven persons were injured. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2017. Potential opium production was estimated at 9,000 tons in 2017, an increase of 87% from its 2016 level (4,800 tons). The increase in production is mainly a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, while an increase in opium yield per hectare also contributed. In 2017, the average opium yield amounted to 27.3 kilograms per hectare, which was 15% higher than in 2016. Yields increased in the Southern region by 19% (from 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016 to 26.2 kilograms per hectare in 2017), in the North-eastern region by 14% (from 31.2 to 35.4 kilograms per hectare) and in the Eastern region by 8% (from 32.4 to 34.9 kilograms per hectare). In the Central and Northern regions, yields decreased by 5% and 6% respectively and remained stable in the Western region. Accounting for 57% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 16% of national production, the Northern region was the second most important opium-producing region in 2017, followed by the Western region (13%) and Eastern region (9%). In response to the increased supply of opium, 2017 prices at harvest time decreased in all regions (between -7% in the Western region and - 50% in the North-eastern region) of Afghanistan except in the Southern region where prices only dropped in the months after the harvest. At almost US$ 1.4 billion (1.2 - 1.5 billion), equivalent to roughly 7% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 55% in 2017 as compared to past year. Reasons for the increase. There is no single reason for the massive 2017 increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The multiple drivers are complex and geographically diverse, as many elements continue to influence farmers' decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. Rule of law-related challenges, such as political instability, lack of government control and security, as well as corruption, have been found to be main drivers of illicit cultivation. Also impact farmers' decisions, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services continue to contribute to the vulnerability of farmers towards opium poppy cultivation. A combination of events may have exacerbated some of these elements and may have led to the large increase in 2017. The shift in strategy by the Afghan government - focusing its efforts against anti-government elements (AGE) in densely populated areas - may have made the rural population more vulnerable to the influence of AGE. This may have subsequently contributed to the strong increase in the area under opium poppy cultivation. Political instability and increased insecurity particularly affected the Northern region, where opium poppy cultivation expanded drastically in the last couple of years. Generally, the weaker engagement of the international aid community may also have reduced the socio-economic development opportunities in rural areas. In Hilmand province, additional factors may have played a role. In 2017, reports from the field indicate that more cheap labour for harvesting might have become available. In combination with increasing yields in 2016, this could have motivated many farmers to take up or expand opium poppy cultivation. The opium harvest requires a large number of skilled labourers, who often come from other provinces of Afghanistan and even from neighbouring countries. In past years, there have been reports of a lack of workers, caused by the on-going fights within Hilmand, which may have led farmers to restrict their investments in opium poppy cultivation to avoid the risk of unharvested fields. The continuing advances in agriculture, including the use of solar panels for powering irrigation pumps and fertilizers and pesticides, may have made opium poppy cultivation increasingly profitable even under unfavourable natural conditions. Solar panels for irrigation seem to have replaced diesel pumps in many areas. These panels require a sizable initial investment, but have lower running costs than diesel-powered pumps and thus can turn desert areas into highly productive arable land at a relatively low cost. The nation-wide high opium farm-gate prices of 2016 might have facilitated some of these investments. Future challenges The 2017 record levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country, its neighbours and the many other countries that are transit for or destination of Afghan opiates. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates will probably further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. More high quality, low cost heroin will reach consumer markets across the world, with increased consumption and related harms as a likely consequence. Addressing the opiate problem in Afghanistan remains a shared responsibility. Only a small share of the revenues generated by the cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opiates reaches Afghan drug trafficking groups. Many more billions of dollars are made from trafficking opiates into major consumer markets, mainly in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the transformation of opium into heroin is likely to bring increased trafficking of precursor substances. Tons of precursor chemicals will potentially be diverted from licit international markets and smuggled into Afghanistan to supply manufacturers of heroin. In Afghanistan, one of the least-developed countries worldwide, the impact of the illicit drug cultivation and production on economic, environmental and social development, continues to be multifaceted. The large increase in opium production will reinforce the negative consequences of the already existing large-scale production of opiates. The expanding illicit economy, which in many provinces has permeated rural societies and made many communities dependent on the income from opium poppy, will further constrain the development of the licit economy and potentially further fuel corruption. The increased levels of opium poppy cultivation also have the potential to exacerbate existing environmental damage caused by over-exploitation of the land for opium. The increased availability of opium and heroin in the country might further raise the social and economic costs associated with the consumption of opiates for drug users, their families, and for society in general. To support the Afghan Government in its efforts to counter illicit crop cultivation, continuing analysis and monitoring of the links between the rule of law, illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is required. The forthcoming MCN/UNODC socio-economic survey report will discuss these factors in detail, presenting an in-depth analysis of the risk factors related to illicit cultivation of opium, as well as the possible consequences and policy considerations for Afghanistan and the international community following this year's record cultivation. Details: Vienna, Austria: 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Opium%20Survey%202017%20(Cultivation%20and%20Production).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/access-to-information/14115/14116 Shelf Number: 154100 Keywords: Development AssistanceDrug CultivationDrug TraffickingFarm-Gate ValueIllicit Crop CultivationIllicit EconomyIllicit TraffickingOpium Poppy CultivationOpium ProductionOpium YieldRule of Law |
Author: Rodriguez, Mariana Title: Venezuela's Escalating Protests, Violence, and Political Instability: The Legacy of Chavez Summary: Over the last three weeks, Venezuela has found itself engulfed in protests against current President Nicolas Maduro's administration. While the student movement has spearheaded this uprising, many Venezuelans have taken to the streets to voice their grievances against the country's high levels of violent crime, high inflation rates, and the increasing scarcity of basic goods. As protests and violence continue, Hugo Chavez's hand‐picked successor faces potentially destabilizing levels of political violence in an era in which protests in other parts of the world (e.g., Ukraine, the Middle East) recently have shown the power of the street. Almost a year after Hugo Chavez's death and Maduro's election, were such high levels of political unrest foreseeable? A brief look at what we refer to as Chavez's "political culture legacy" suggests that, in the absence of Chavez‐like charismatic leadership and under the weight of the social and economic problems noted above, political instability was a likely outcome. To understand the nature of democratic attitudes under the Chavez regime and how they might help us understand the political instability in the country today, this Topical Brief analyzes survey data from the AmericasBarometer in Venezuela between 2007 and 2012. As in previous AmericasBarometer studies, we examine two attitudinal dimensions essential to democratic stability: political legitimacy (or system support) and political tolerance. Combining a society's level of support for the political system and its willingness to tolerate opposition to that system provides us a more general assessment of the type of political environment that such political attitudes are likely to engender (Seligson 2000; Booth and Seligson 2009; see also previous AmericasBarometer Reports). For example, in a country in which citizens express high levels of support for their political system and high levels of political tolerance, we can expect this political culture to be conducive to the emergence of a stable democratic system of government. Conversely, in a country where citizens neither support the political system nor tolerate those with different political views, the attitudinal landscape will likely not support a stable democracy but rather be more conducive to democratic breakdown. Details: Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2014. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 14, 2019 at: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB013en.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Venezuela URL: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB013en.pdf Shelf Number: 154144 Keywords: DemocracyHugo ChavezPolitical InstabilityPolitical LegitimacyPolitical ViolenceProtestRule of LawVenezuela |
Author: Duhalt, Adrian Title: Looting Fuel Pipelines in Mexico Summary: While Pemex was the sole player in Mexico's oil and gas industry, gasoline theft seemed to be something of a minor problem, a localized activity controlled by a few gangs. Fuel theft, however, has grown over time - partly due to a hands-off approach embraced by Mexican authorities for years, if not decades - and has reportedly attracted the attention of more sophisticated criminal organizations seeking to diversify their illegal activities. Over the last few years, factors such as increased demand for stolen fuels, a weak rule of law, and the lack of economic opportunities in local communities have played a crucial role in reshaping the configuration of the now widespread black market in stolen fuels. Illegal trade in fuels is booming, further incentivizing new entrants into this black market. The extent of fuel theft is now so great that it is becoming a serious financial burden for Pemex and, more broadly, may pose a challenge to the implementation of policies aimed at the liberalization of the gasoline market in Mexico. Details: Houston, Texas: Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18, 2019 at: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/96f1e489/BI-Brief-062317-MEX_FuelTheft.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/looting-fuel-pipelines-mexico/ Shelf Number: 154235 Keywords: Criminal Organizations Fuel Theft Gangs Gasoline Theft Looting Oil Industry Rule of Law |
Author: Commins, Stephen Title: From Urban Fragility to Urban Stability Summary: HIGHLIGHTS - The share of Africa's urban residents living in slums is steadily rising, an outgrowth of the continent's rapidly expanding population. Meanwhile, residents of African cities report among the highest levels of fear of violence in the world. - The inability of government institutions to resolve or at least mitigate conflicts over land, property rights, and services for urban residents, coupled with either absent or heavy-handed responses of security agencies in African slums, is contributing to a growing mistrust of African security and justice institutions. - Integrated urban development strategies - involving local government, police, justice institutions, the private sector, and youth - are necessary to build trust and adapt policies that strengthen economic opportunities, social cohesion, and security in Africa's cities. Details: Los Angelos, California: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2018. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2019 at: https://africacenter.org/publication/from-urban-fragility-to-urban-stability/ Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ASB35EN-From-Urban-Fragility-to-Urban-Stability.pdf Shelf Number: 154655 Keywords: AfricaCitiesConflicts over LandFear of CrimeLand GovernanceProperty RightsRule of LawSecurity SectorUrban |
Author: Alliance for Justice Title: Trump's Attacks On Our Justice System: President Trump, the Federal Judiciary and the 115th Congress Summary: For nearly 40 years, Alliance for Justice has worked to ensure that our nation's justice system advances core constitutional values, preserves critical rights and unfettered access to the courts, and adheres to the even-handed administration of justice for all Americans. We have never witnessed an assault on our justice system like the one we have seen since Donald Trump became President. President Trump has repeatedly demonstrated his contempt for the rule of law. His likely criminality is referenced in court filings. He has verbally attacked judges who have ruled against him. He has stated that he expects personal loyalty from those in law enforcement. He has demanded investigations into the media and political opponents. He has repeatedly tried to undermine independent investigations. He has mocked constitutional rights. He has abused his pardon authority. He has repeatedly acted in ways struck down by courts. His attempts to subvert the independence of the Department of Justice are especially egregious, and a detailed examination of those actions could easily consume an entire report. Indeed, a point-by-point recitation of President Trump's shameful conduct in office could consume several reports. This retrospective report, however, issued after the 115th Congress, will focus on one specific aspect of Trump's impact on our justice system: the judicial nominations, put forward by the White House, that have emanated from organizations funded by the wealthy and powerful and have been expedited by the Senate's disregard for norms and rules. The President has placed numerous ultraconservative individuals on the bench who will erode rights and legal protections for generations, long after he leaves the White House. This report contains appendices documenting many of Trump's ideological nominees from the 115th Congress. Appendices A-U are replete with nominees who have histories of bigoted and offensive comments, troubling records, and bias. Yet, with very few exceptions, every single Republican in the Senate voted for these individuals. In many cases, evidence of offensive writings, prejudicial policy positions, and/or a glaring absence of experience still did not dissuade Republicans en masse from supporting a judicial nominee. This retrospective report reviews the first two years of judicial nominations and confirmations during the Trump presidency. Except where otherwise noted, all data and analyses pertain to the period ending on January 3, 2019, which marked the end of the 115th Congress. Part I provides data as to persons nominated and confirmed. Part II describes what many of the nominees have in common - records of working to eviscerate critical rights and legal protections. Part III describes the erosion of rules and norms to confirm many of President Trump's nominees. Part IV offers hope, because we believe that all those who care deeply about fair-minded judges and courts can still find reasons to remain optimistic about the future despite the current President's assaults on the rule of law and our rights. Finally, the appendices provide information on select nominees' records, broken down by subject matter. Details: Washington, DC: Author, 2019. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2019 at: https://afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Trumps-Attacks-on-Our-Justice-System-Final.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Trumps-Attacks-on-Our-Justice-System-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 155357 Keywords: Court System Federal Judiciary Judges Judicial Nominees Justice System Rule of law |